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I. 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. 
Appellant Bonnie Thornock was the plaintiff below; Respondent 
Dorothy Jensen was the defendant. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§78-2-2(3) (k) and 78-
29-3(2) (j), U.C.A. The Order granting summary judgment was entered 
on July 30, 1996 (R.62-65; A.1-4). Appellant's timely notice of 
appeal was filed on August 19, 1996 (R. 72-74) . This proceeding was 
transferred from the Supreme Court to this Court on or about 
October 22, 1996. 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from an order granting summary judgment. 
Accordingly, this Court reviews all issues as questions of law for 
correctness, with no deference to the conclusions of the trial 
court. See Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 
1111-12 (Utah 1991). 
The issues presented for review are: 
(1) Whether or not the court below erred by granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of a 
release, where that defendant was not named or 
specifically identified therein as required by §78-27-42, 
U.C.A. (preserved for review at R.35-37). 
(2) Whether or not the court below erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, where it selectively 
1 
used extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of a release, 
which the court itself found to be unambiguous, and 
resolved disputed issues of fact (preserved for review at 
R.91-92, 95) . 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE1 
Section 78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated: 
A release given by a person seeking 
recovery to one or more defendants 
does not discharge any other 
defendant unless the release so 
provides. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the 
Lower Court. 
This appeal arises out of a negligence suit including an 
automobile accident, which occurred on November 15, 1993. 
Plaintiff Bonnie Thornock filed suit on February 22, 1994, alleging 
that Defendant Dorothy Jensen was negligent in causing that 
accident (R.l-5). After answering the Complaint, Mrs. Jensen moved 
for summary judgment, on the basis of a "release" signed by Mrs. 
Thornock on or about November 30, 1993 (R.16-17, 30; A. 5). 
xThis appeal involves no determinative constitutional 
provisions, ordinances, rules or regulations. 
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Plaintiff appeals from the Order granting summary judgment in favor 
of defendant and dismissing her action (A.1-4). Plaintiff 
maintains, that the release, upon which defendant relies, is 
ineffective because it lists only Lowell Jensen, the defendant's 
husband, instead of the defendant (A.5). 
Defendant filed her motion for summary judgment and supporting 
memorandum on April 30, 1996 (R.16-30). Defendant relied solely 
upon the release (A.5), but did not assert, that she was to have 
been named in addition to, or instead of, her husband (R.16-22). 
Rather, defendant expressly argued, that she came within the ambit 
of broad boilerplate language, purporting to release anyone who 
might be liable (R.19-20). In addition to the release, defendant 
submitted an affidavit from Jim Lancaster in support of her motion 
(R.27-29). Mr. Lancaster was the adjuster for defendant's insurer, 
Windsor Insurance Group, who obtained Mrs. Thornock's signature on 
the release (R.27-29). Lancaster testifies as to the general 
circumstances of the signing of the release, and his opinion as to 
its meaning. (R.28-29). His affidavit is silent as to why the 
release names only Mr. Jensen (R.27-29). 
Plaintiff's opposing memorandum (R.35-39), which was filed on 
I 
or about May 23, 1996, relied upon §78-27-42, U.C.A., as construed 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Child v. Newsome, 892 P. 2d 9 (Utah 
1995). Plaintiff argued, that, under that holding, Mrs. Jensen 
3 
could not be discharged by a release naming only her husband (R.36-
37). Because her opposition was based solely upon a controlling 
point of law, plaintiff, at that time, offered no supporting 
evidence for her position. 
In her reply (R.40-46), which was filed on or about June 7, 
1996, defendant argued, for the first time, that the parties 
actually intended Dorothy Jensen, rather than Lowell Jensen, to 
have been named in the release. Noting that she was the one 
involved in the accident, defendant states: 
[T] o whom else could the Release 
have applied except Dorothy Jensen? 
Semantics aside, plaintiff and 
[Windsor] entered in to a Release 
which the parties intended to apply 
to Dorothy Jensen. 
(R.45). 
Defendant also offered a Supplemental Affidavit from Lancaster 
(R.47-49). He states, there, that he and plaintiff negotiated, and 
intended to release, claims against Dorothy Jensen (R.48). He also 
states that Lowell's name appeared on the release (presumably, by 
mistake) because he "is the policyholder" (R.48) . That is the only 
explanation offered by defendant for the discrepancy. 
In response to the Supplemental Affidavit, plaintiff offered 
her own affidavit on or about June 20, 1996 (R.56-58). Plaintiff 
states, that the $469.00, which she received, was intended to cover 
only her broken glasses and lost wages to the date of the release 
4 
(R.57). She states, that she "never intended to release anyone, 
especially the negligent driver, defendant Dorothy Jensen" (R.57). 
She also states, that the release was "blank" when she signed it 
and, that she "simply took Mr. Lancaster, at his word, " that it was 
for her glasses and lost time to date (R.57). 
Oral argument was held on June 21, 1996 (R.82-107). The 
parties disagreed as to whether or not the release was ambiguous 
and, if it was, as to the intention of the parties. The court 
ruled for defendant, stating: 
[T]he release was not ambiguous . . 
when Mrs. Thornock signed the 
release she intended to release the 
defendant . . . That's the only 
reasonable method to read the 
release, because that's the only 
defendant with whom she was dealing. 
(R.105). 
A written order, granting defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, was entered on July 30, 1996 (A. 1-4). Among other 
things, the court found: that plaintiff received $469.00 "for out-
of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering"; that "the Release is not 
ambiguous"; that "the intent of the parties is clear on the face of 
the Release . . . [They] intended the Release to apply to 
[plaintiff's] claims against Dorothy Jensen" (R.63-64). 
Plaintiff filed her timely notice of appeal on August 19, 
1996. 
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B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review. 
The only evidence presented by defendant was the release 
itself and the two affidavits given by Lancaster (A.5; R.27-30, 50-
52). Plaintiff's evidence consisted of the release and her 
affidavit (A.5; R.56-58). The uncontradicted portions of the 
pleadings would also be taken as true for purposes of summary 
judgment. 
Certain facts are undisputed here. Mrs. Thornock and Mrs. 
Jensen were involved in an automobile accident, on November 15, 
1993. Mr. Jensen was not, although the policy covering the Jensen 
vehicle was in his name. The document in question--the release--
was executed on or about November 30, 1993, about two weeks later. 
Mrs. Thornock was not represented by counsel at that time. She was 
also under treatment and taking pain medication (R.57). She 
received $469.00 from Windsor. As of February 1994, when the 
complaint was filed, plaintiff's medical bills already exceeded 
$6,000 (R.2).2 
Obviously, what the release "says" is not in dispute. On its 
face, it purports to be a full release as to any claim, which 
plaintiff might have against Lowell Jensen. It is also noteworthy, 
that the release is not dated, witnessed or notarized. It is not 
2Plaintiff has also alleged that she has suffered a partial, 
possibly permanent, impairment (R.3). 
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signed by Lowell Jensen, Dorothy Jensen, Jim Lancaster or anyone 
from Windsor. It does not purport to be mutual. It is a form, 
boilerplate document, prepared by Windsor, with blank spaces to be 
completed. Defendant does not deny, that the release form was 
blank when signed (R.56-57). 
The factual dispute, here, relates to the circumstances, under 
which the document was executed, and the intent of parties. 
According to Mr. Lancaster's first affidavit, this was intended to 
be a full and complete release of any claim against anybody 
generally (R.28). He states that the $460.00 was for Mrs. 
Thornock's glasses and any expenses, pain and suffering, and that 
he explained to Mrs. Thornock that it was a full and complete 
release (R.28). According to Lancaster's second, supplemental, 
affidavit, the parties specifically intended to release Dorothy 
Jensen (R.51). Mrs. Thornock's affidavit denies that she intended 
to release anyone--particularly Dorothy Jensen (R.56-58). She 
states, that Mr. Lancaster represented to her that she was being 
paid only for broken eye glasses and for a couple of weeks of lost 
wages. 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The error committed below is readily apparent, as is the 
injustice of the decision. The court allowed defendant and her 
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insurer to "have their proverbial cake and eat it too." They were 
allowed to retain the advantage of a signature, which was obtained 
by questionable means, while avoiding the consequences of putting 
"Lowell Jensen" on the form. 
If the release is unambiguous, as the court held, it cannot be 
effective as to claims against Dorothy Jensen because she is not 
named therein. If extrinsic evidence is allowed to change "Lowell" 
to "Dorothy," then the release must be ambiguous. In that case, 
other extrinsic evidence is also admissible, and there exists a 
factual dispute as to the parties' intent and the effectiveness of 
the release. In either event, summary judgment was improper. 
A. The Release Cannot Be Effective as to an Unnamed Party. 
Section 78-27-42, U.C.A. provides, that a release as to one 
defendant "does not discharge any other defendant unless the 
release so provides." Pursuant to that provision, "a release must 
contain language either naming the defendant or identifying the 
defendant with some degree of specificity in order to discharge 
that defendant from liability." Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 12 
(Utah 1995) . Dorothy Jensen is not named in the release. She is 
not identified with the degree of specificity, required under 
Child. The release cannot discharge defendant, as a matter of law. 
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B. If the Release is Open to Interpretation as to the Party 
Released, It Is Open to a Factual Dispute as to the Parties' 
Overall Intent. 
Extrinsic evidence, such as that required to change "Lowell" 
to "Dorothy," is admissible only if the release is ambiguous. See 
Krauss v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Utah 
App. 1993) .3 Once that door is open, there is a fact issue as to 
the parties' true intent, as to which all relevant extrinsic 
evidence is admissible. JEd. If that evidence is in dispute, 
summary judgment is improper. See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). Indeed, it is arguable, that an 
"ambiguous" release (one requiring interpretation via parole 
evidence ) is simply invalid. See Simonsen v. Travis, 728 P. 2d 
999, 1002 (Utah 1986) ("a release, to be enforceable, must at a 
minimum be unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal"). 
Here, extrinsic evidence was necessarily relied upon to change 
"Lowell Jensen" to "Dorothy Jensen." Therefore, the release had to 
be ambiguous, and the court below erred in holding otherwise. 
Moreover, once the court resorted to extrinsic evidence, it could 
3The court, in Krauss, rejected the argument that §78-27-42 
required that the party claiming to be discharged be named in the 
release. See 852 P.2d at 1018. It was overruled on that point in 
Child, 892 P. 2d at 11, n.4. Notwithstanding that aspect of its 
reasoning, the court in Krauss proceeded to hold that UDOT had 
failed to carry its burden to prove that it was an intended 
beneficiary of the release. See 852 P.2d at 1022-23. 
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not ignore the factual dispute, which existed as to the parties' 
intentions. It could not grant summary judgment on the basis of a 
release which was less than unambiguous and unequivocal. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
In her motion, as originally presented, defendant specifically 
relied upon the broad, general language of the release, which 
purported to discharge anyone who might be liable (R.18-26). That 
argument is directly contrary to Child v. Newsome, 8 92 P.2d 9, 12 
(Utah 1995), which is dispositive here. As a matter of law, a 
party not named in a release cannot claim to be discharged by it. 
Id. 
Faced with Child, defendant changed her argument. Instead of 
asserting that she was covered by the general language of the 
release, defendant maintained that the claims against her were the 
actual object of the release, notwithstanding that it expressly 
referred only to her husband. In that regard, defendant 
necessarily relied upon extrinsic evidence, in the from of 
Lancaster's testimony as to what was intended. Defendant, thereby, 
opened the door to other extrinsic evidence--namely, Mrs. 
Thornock's affidavit--which creates a factual dispute as to intent. 
That dispute renders summary judgment inappropriate. 
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Finally, there is an issue of simple justice and fairness 
here. It would appear, that Mrs. Thornock may have made the 
mistake of relying upon Lancaster's word, and signing something 
which she did not really intend. The harsh, but expedient, 
consequences of that would be that she is bound by what she signed. 
Contract law requires, that a person read what she signs. On the 
other hand, that same unforgiving philosophy should apply equally 
to those who draft, as well as sign, written agreements. Before an 
insurance company cajoles someone into releasing her claims, it 
should be careful to get the paperwork correct. Otherwise, it, 
too, should be bound by what is written, rather than what may have 
been intended. 
(A) 
As a Matter of Law, a Party Who is Not 
Specifically Identified in a Release 
Cannot be Discharged by that Release 
The Court's unanimous holding in Child is unequivocal--"a 
release must contain language either naming the defendant or 
identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in order 
to discharge that defendant from liability." 892 P.2d at 12 
(emphasis added) . That case and rule are dispositive. Mrs. Jensen 
cannot be discharged by the release because she is neither named 
nor specifically described therein. Child expressly precludes 
11 
resorting to extrinsic evidence to add or change who is being 
discharged. 
Defendant argued, below, that Child does not apply because 
Mrs. Thornock was not seeking to recover from more than one 
defendant. It is true that, in Child, the plaintiff released the 
driver and owners of the vehicle in which his decedent had been 
riding, and that the issue was whether or not the driver of another 
vehicle was discharged. Yet, neither the language of the statute 
cited nor the reasoning of the Court limits the holding in Child to 
cases where more than one party was alleged to be actively 
negligent. Indeed, the statute, by its plain terms, applies to 
"[a] release given by a person seeking recovery . . . " §78-27-42, 
U.C.A. It does not specify from whom or from how many recovery 
must be sought. It certainly does not say "seeking recovery from 
joint-tortfeasors." There is nothing in Child, which limits its 
application based upon the number or nature of the tortfeasors. 892 
P.2d at 10-12.4 
Defendant completely misstated the holding in Child by arguing 
that it turned upon whom the parties to the release intended to 
discharge (R.44). What the Court actually held, was that, insofar 
4Ironically, the parties named in the release in Child 
included the parents of the driver of the vehicle in which the 
decedent was riding. Their only exposure was as the owners of the 
vehicle--precisely, the same as Mr. Jensen's potential exposure 
here. 
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as the identity of those being discharged is concerned, the intent 
of the parties is to be determined solely by who is named or 
specifically described. See 892 P.2d at 11. Indeed, had it held 
otherwise, it would have had no reason or basis to overrule part of 
Krauss. See Child, 892 P.2d at 11, n.4 (discussing Krauss v. UDOT, 
852 P. 2d 1014) . In Krauss, the court held that UDOT was not 
discharged, but it did so by looking beyond whether or not UDOT was 
named in the release and by considering extrinsic evidence of the 
parties' intent. See 852 P.2d at 1022-23. Under Child, the inquiry 
should have halted with the fact, that UDOT was neither named nor 
described. The same is true here. Regardless of who or how many 
others were or might have been liable and to what extent, Dorothy 
Jensen was not named in the release. She cannot be discharged. 
Defendant made a half-hearted attempt to claim that she was 
"identified" in the release with a sufficient "degree of 
particularity" to meet the standard enunciated in Child, 892 P.2d 
at 12. Her position seems to be, that she is an heir, agent or 
servant of her husband and, therefore, sufficiently identified. 
Under this reasoning, if the plaintiff in Child had settled only 
with the driver's parents, the driver would have nevertheless been 
discharged under a boilerplate reference to "heirs." Nothing in 
Child suggests such a result. Indeed, such reasoning is contrary 
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to the basic premise of the case, that boilerplate language cannot 
be used to expand the parties being released.5 
In short, under Child, Mrs. Jensen is barred by law from 
claiming the benefits of a release in which she is not named. What 
was intended or why she was not named are irrelevant 
considerations. Summary judgment was improper, because there is no 
written document specifically releasing this defendant from 
liability 
(B) 
Consideration of Defendant7s Extrinsic 
Evidence Is Proper Only if the Release Is 
Ambiguous, Which Creates a Factual Dispute 
Precluding Summary Judgment 
The name "Dorothy Jensen" does not appear on the face of the 
release (A.5). She could not have obtained summary judgment by 
merely authenticating and offering that release into evidence. She 
needed Lancaster's testimony, as to the parties' intentions and why 
the release names Lowell Jensen. That testimony is extrinsic 
evidence, which the court necessarily considered in granting 
5In all probability, the "identifi[ed] . . .with some degree 
of particularity" language refers to situations where potentially, 
but remotely, liable parties are either unknown or too numerous to 
name. For example, a release as to a corporation would typically 
include, by description, its agents, employees, officers and 
directors. References to "heirs" and the like are intended to 
preclude liability as to successors in interest for the acts of 
their predecessors. Child does not permit an actively negligent, 
easily named individual to bootstrap herself within the ambit of 
such protection. 
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summary judgment. It necessarily erred by ignoring Mrs. Thornock's 
contrary evidence and the fact dispute it created. 
Releases are contracts, to be interpreted according to the 
same rules of construction as other contracts. See Krauss v. Utah 
State Department of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1018 (Utah App. 1993) . 
The threshold issue of whether or not a release is ambiguous, is a 
question of law for the court. See 852 P. 2d at 1019. If--and only 
±JE — there is an ambiguity, may extrinsic evidence be considered in 
order "to clarify the contractual intent of the parties". Id. 
Accord Winecrar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) . 
Extrinsic evidence may not be used to create an ambiguity or to 
vary the terms of an otherwise unequivocal agreement. The court 
below, therefore, erred one way or the other by holding this 
release to be ambiguous, yet using extrinsic evidence to alter its 
plain terms. 
If the release was, indeed, unambiguous, it had to be applied 
according to its plain terms. See Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. It 
had to be construed as releasing only Lowell Jensen, the party 
named therein. If Lancaster's testimony was properly considered, 
the release would have to be ambiguous. In that case, all 
extrinsic evidence, including Mrs. Thornock's affidavit, would be 
admissible as the issue of what the parties intended. Her 
affidavit denies that she intended to fully release anyone, which 
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renders summary judgment inappropriate because weighing extrinsic 
evidence is a fact-finding function for the jury. See Colonial 
Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986); 
Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. 
Moreover, the defendant, here, had the burden of proof with 
regard to whether or not it was intended that she be released. See 
Krauss, 852 P. 2d at 1023 ("when a party not specifically named . . 
attempts to avail itself of [a] release, that party bears the 
burden of pro[of]M). Mrs. Thornock's testimony was material 
different from Lancaster's version of events (which was 
insufficient to carry defendant's burden, in any event). See 
Krauss, 852 P.2d at 1021-23. Summary judgment for defendant on 
this issue particularly was inappropriate. See Colonial Leasing, 
731 P.2d at 488; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. 
Indeed, if any party should have been able to obtain summary 
judgment on this issue, it would be the plaintiff. Extrinsic 
evidence may be used to clarify the parties' intent, not to change 
the material terms of their agreement.6 The identity of the party 
being released is certainly a material term. Additionally, unlike 
contracts in general, a release is not enforceable at all, unless 
it is "unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal." Simonsen v. Travis, 
6If this release had just referred to "Jensen," extrinsic 
evidence could be used to clarify whether that meant Lowell or 
Dorothy. 
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728 P.2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1986). Arguably, once a release is found 
to be ambiguous, the inquiry is concluded and it is simply 
unenforceable. Id. That is particularly true where, as here, the 
release was drafted by, or on behalf of, the party seeking its 
protection. See Simonsen, 728 P.2d at 1002 (" [p]laintiff should 
not have to bear the risk of understanding State Farm's intent 
which was couched in its own ambiguous language"). Here, Mrs. 
Thornock should not have to bear the burden of Windsor's inability 
to write the release it claims to have intended. 
As erroneous as the court's decision is, it is still somewhat 
comprehensible. It bears a certain logic to suggest that, if Mrs. 
Thornock signed a release, she must have intended it to apply to 
the driver of the car which hit her.7 Yet, the law does not require 
written agreements to be logical. It only requires them to be 
clear. The release in question clearly applies to Lowell, not 
Dorothy, Jensen. Any other conclusion requires rewriting what 
Windsor Insurance put in writing. 
And, therein lies the rub. It is just as logical to question 
why Mrs. Thornock would knowingly release Dorothy Jensen in 
7One problem is, that this reasoning could apply to any 
situation wherein a party with remote or doubtful liability was 
released. It would allow jointly represented or insured parties to 
negotiate the release of the minimally liable, then argue that it 
really meant someone else. Here, Mr. Jensen, as an owner of the 
vehicle driven by his wife, had at lease some exposure to 
liability. 
17 
exchange for $460.00, as it is to question why Lowell would be 
released at all. If the uninformed, unrepresented accident victim 
is to be held to a carelessly given signature, then the 
sophisticated, aggressive insurer must be held to the plain terms 
of the release which it drafted. The only reasonable alternative 
would be to allow both parties a reprieve, and submit the matter to 
a j ury. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below erred in just substituting "Dorothy Jensen" 
for "Lowell Jensen" in the release, particularly if the release was 
unambiguous, as the court found. Under Child, only named parties 
are discharged by a release. Defendant was not named; she is not 
discharged. Alternatively, if there was some need for 
clarification, there is an issue of fact for the jury. In either 
event, summary judgment for defendant was improper. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits, that the decision granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and 
this case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this / *? day of J&b— , 1997. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Bv: _^-U %^ 
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DOROTHY JENSEN, ] 
Defendant. ' 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 960901305PI 
\ Judge David S. Young 
On June 21,1996, the Court heard oral argument on defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Defendant was represented by Kenneth W. Maxwell of Strong & 
HannL Plaintiff was represented by Albert W. Gray of Robert J. DeBry & Associates, 
The Court, having received and considered the parties' legal memoranda, the Affidavit 
of Jim Lancaster, the Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster, and the Affidavit of Bonnie 
Thornock filed in conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment, and having heard 013I 
argument thereon, and finding good cause therefor, 
3275.681 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. On approximately November 15, 1993, plaintiff Bonnie Thomock and defendant 
Dorothy Jensen were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of 9000 South and 
Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah. 
2. The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured with Windsor Insurance 
Group ("Windsor"). 
3. On November 30, 1993, Bonnie Thomock met with a Resident Casualty 
Claims Adjuster for Windsor named Jim Lancaster. 
4. Mr. Lancaster and Ms. Thomock agreed that Windsor would pay Ms. Thomock 
$469.00 for out-of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering. 
5. In exchange for $469.00, Ms. Thomock executed a Release of All Claims 
("Release"). 
6. The Release provides in relevant part: 
[T]he undersigned, being of lawful age, for and in consideration 
of Four Hundred & Sixtv-Nine & 00/00 Dollars ($469.00) to the 
undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable considera-
tion, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and 
for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 
assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Lowell Jensen and 
his, her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associa-
tions or partnerships of an[d] from any and all claims, actions, 
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, 
expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned 
now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in 
any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen 
and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property dapiage 
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and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the 
accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 15th 
day of Nov., 1922, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.f-1 West 
Jordan, Ut. 
The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All Claims 
releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or part-
nerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced 
accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the 
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same. 
7. The Release does not identify Dorothy Jensen by name but rather lists the name 
"Lowell Jensen." 
8. Lowell Jensen is Dorothy Jensen's husband. 
9. Dorothy Jensen's insurance policy with Windsor was issued in her husband, 
Lowell Jensen's name. 
10. Lowell Jensen was not involved in the automobile accident between Dorothy 
Jensen and Bonnie Thornock. 
11. Jim Lancaster listed Lowell Jensen's name on the Release because the insurance 
policy was issued in Lowell Jensen's name. 
12. The Release is not ambiguous. 
13. The intent of the parties is clear on the face of the Release. The parties intended 
the Release to apply to Bonnie Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen. 
14. The application of the Release to Dorothy Jensen is the only reasonable 
interpretation of the Release because there is no grounds for any liability between Bonnie 
Thornock and Lowell Jensen. 
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15. The Release applies to the claims raised by Bonnie Thomock in her Complaint 
against Dorothy Jensen, 
16. The Release is a valid and enforceable accord and satisfaction. 
17. By the Release, Bonnie Thomock has settled all her claims against Dorothy Jensen 
arising out of the automobile accident on November 15, 1993 at the intersection of 90th South 
and Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah. 
AND THEREFORE: 
Defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff 
Bonnie Thornock's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the merits, no cause of action. 
DATED this of > £ > v , 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Albert W. Gray 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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DavfdS. Young ' * / 
District Court Judge 
/ -C 
Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
#9 Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE THORNOCK, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
DOROTHY JENSEN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 960901305PI 
> Judge David S. Young 
On June 21,1996, the Court heard oral argument on defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Defendant was represented by Kenneth W. Maxwell of Strong & 
Hanni. Plaintiff was represented by Albert W. Gray of Robert J. DeBry & Associates. 
The Court, having received and considered the parties' legal memoranda, the Affidavit 
of Jim Lancaster, the Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster, and the Affidavit of Bonnie 
Thomock filed in conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment, and having hear&x)raL 
argument thereon, and finding good cause therefor, 
3275.681 
Fli F HODV 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. On approximately November 15, 1993, plaintiff Bonnie Thomock and defendant 
Dorothy Jensen were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of 9000 South and 
Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah. 
2. The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured with Windsor Insurance 
Group ("Windsor"). 
3. On November 30, 1993, Bonnie Thomock met with a Resident Casualty 
Claims Adjuster for Windsor named Jim Lancaster. 
4. Mr. Lancaster and Ms. Thomock agreed that Windsor would pay Ms. Thomock 
$469.00 for out-of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering. 
5. In exchange for $469.00, Ms. Thomock executed a Release of All Claims 
("Release"). 
6. The Release provides in relevant part: 
[T]he undersigned, being of lawful age, for and in consideration 
of Four Hundred & Sixty-Nine & 00/00 Dollars ($469.00) to the 
undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable considera-
tion, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and 
for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 
assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Lowell Jensen and 
his, her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associa-
tions or partnerships of an[d] from any and all claims, actions, 
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, 
expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned 
now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in 
any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen 
and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage 
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and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the 
accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 15th 
day of Nov.. 1993, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.f.] West 
Jordan. Ut. 
The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All Claims 
releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or part-
nerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced 
accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the 
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same. 
7. The Release does not identify Dorothy Jensen by name but rather lists the name 
"Lowell Jensen." 
8. Lowell Jensen is Dorothy Jensen's husband. 
9. Dorothy Jensen's insurance policy with Windsor was issued in her husband, 
Lowell Jensen's name. 
10. Lowell Jensen was not involved in the automobile accident between Dorothy 
Jensen and Bonnie Thornock. 
11. Jim Lancaster listed Lowell Jensen's name on the Release because the insurance 
policy was issued in Lowell Jensen's name. 
12. The Release is not ambiguous. 
13. The intent of the parties is clear on the face of the Release. The parties intended 
the Release to apply to Bonnie Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen. 
14. The application of the Release to Dorothy Jensen is the only reasonable 
interpretation of the Release because there is no grounds for any liability between Bonnie 
Thornock and Lowell Jensen. 
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15. The Release applies to the claims raised by Bonnie Thornock in her Complaint 
against Dorothy Jensen. 
16. The Release is a valid and enforceable accord and satisfaction. 
17. By the Release, Bonnie Thornock has settled all her claims against Dorothy Jensen 
arising out of the automobile accident on November 15, 1993 at the intersection of 90th South 
and Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah. 
AND THEREFORE: 
Defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff 
Bonnie Thornock's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the merits, no cause of action. 
DATED this $@s day of ^^jjJ^y 1996. 
" BYTHE COURT 
}o <?• Vu^i 
David S. Young 
District Court Judge 
?• 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Albert W. Gray 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3275 681 4 
n number ^-£"77 & y yr.^ 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
Know all men by these presents: 
That the undersigned, being of lawful age, for^ and in consideration of 
to the undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby 
and for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge 
and his, her their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associations 
or partnerships of an from any and all claims, acttons, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses, and 
compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of 
any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal irguries and property damage and the consequences thereof 
resulting or to result fromthie accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the s>r ~" day of >V o i/„ . 19 
at or near *?<? "~ ^Tcr^^yj^ v^ s^^t? •<^s* us? <^£^ 4^^^ ^. — 
The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All claims releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or 
partnerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the 
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same. 
It is understood and agreed that the party or parties hereby released do not consent to this release, admit no liability to the 
undersigned or others, shall not be stopped or otherwise barred from asserting and expressly reserve the right to assert any claim or 
cause of action such party or parties may have against the undersigned or others. 
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that 
recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making the Release, it is understood and agree, that the undersigned relies wholly 
upon the undersigned's judgement, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability therefore 
and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or parties hereby released or their representative or by 
any physician or surgeon by them employed. 
The undersigned further declares and represents that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made 
to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this Release 
are contractual and not a mere recital. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT. 
Signed, sealed and delivered this day of ^ , , 19 
Witness s ,$/>-^^JL-& <^?/£^<^^^SrT^^ LS 
Witness LS 
Witness LS 





..19 , before me personally appeared 
to me known to be the person(s) named herein and who executed the foregoing Release and 
has (have) read the foregoing releasee and understand(s) the contents tflereof and that 
same. 
My term expires _ 
Cl-147b 
y 7/9'r y^o tr^7^> 
acknowledged to me that 
__ voluntarily executed the 
^
 /^L Notary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT' BRIEF (Thornock v. Jensen) was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this JiO day of f\&>$ruCf f-y , 1997 to the following: 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Kenneth W. Maxwell 
STRONG Sc HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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